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Abstract:  This article provides a holistic legal 
analysis of the use of cookies in Online Behavioural 
Advertising. The current EU legislative framework 
is outlined in detail, and the legal obligations are 
examined. Consent and the debates surrounding 
its implementation form a large portion of the 
analysis. The article outlines the current difficulties 
associated with the reliance on this requirement as 
a condition for the placing and accessing of cookies. 
Alternatives to this approach are explored, and the 
implementation of solutions based on the application 
of the Privacy by Design and Privacy by Default 
concepts are presented. This discussion involves an 
analysis of the use of code and, therefore, product 
architecture to ensure adequate protections.  
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A. Introduction
1 The commercialisation of the internet has been 
rapid. Ubiquitous technological development and 
internet availability have propelled profits and the 
value of information. Online Behavioural Advertising 
(OBA) through the tracking of users has allowed for 
the development of user-targeted campaigns. The 
debates surrounding the legitimacy of this behaviour 
have been contentious. Traditional legal principles 
have struggled to come to terms with the rapid 
proliferation of internet technologies. The rigidity of 
the legal framework contrasts strongly with the fluid 
and ever-changing IT sector. In essence, tracking 
and the resulting profiling have become a key part 
of the business model of many Web 2.0 services, but 
the legality of this behaviour is still unclear.1
2 The aim of this analysis is to examine the use of 
cookies in the tracking of users for the purposes of 
targeted advertising. Certain restrictions regarding 
the scope of this article should be acknowledged 
from the outset. First, it will be restricted to 
an examination of the use of cookies in OBA in 
order to track and profile users. Accordingly, an 
examination of the emerging use of technologies 
and techniques such as Browser Fingerprinting, 
Deep Packet Inspection and History Sniffing does 
not come within the scope of this article. Further, the 
article will not explore the legal issues around the 
use of analytics systems which correlate various data 
sources (including the cookie data) and, hence, the 
Big Data elements of this topic. Although, in reality, 
user profiles in OBA contain data from various 
sources in addition to cookies, this does not mitigate 
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the fact that the tracking and processing of cookie 
data constitutes profiling in itself. The text will also 
not outline the additional considerations necessary 
for a holistic interpretation of the use of tracking 
technologies on mobile devices. Finally, during the 
assessment of the consent issue, the article will focus 
on the general issues and concerns rather than the 
particular debates specific to children (or others 
who potentially lack capacity to consent). These are 
issues which merit further analysis in themselves, 
and to examine them here would not do justice to 
the complex legal issues present. Nevertheless, at 
times references to these matters and the further 
obligations will be made. 
3 Having narrowed the scope, it is now worth outlining 
the focus of the research. The Article 29 Working 
Party has noted that most advertising technologies 
use some type of client side processing of users’ 
browsers or terminal equipment to track their 
activity.2 This processing refers to the accessing and 
use of information stored on users’ computers. In 
behavioural advertising, companies use software to 
track user behaviour and to build personal profiles. 
They do not refer to users by name but, instead, use 
a single alphanumerical code that is placed on the 
users’ computers. These codes are utilised to help 
select the advertisements people see in addition to 
the variety of products that are offered to them.3 
These are known as ‘cookies,’ and they can provide 
a detailed profile based on user behaviour, which can 
be easily exploited for marketing purposes. 
4 Cookies placed on users’ machines by the publisher 
(website operator) are known as first-party 
cookies and these, ‘are commonly used to store 
information, e.g., user preferences, such as a login 
name.’4 These ‘functional cookies’ are generally 
exempt from the legal obligations under the Data 
Protection framework unless they are also used 
for tracking or profiling purposes.5 However, there 
are also what are known as third-party cookies. 
These cookies originate from sources that may be 
unconnected with the first-party cookie website 
(e.g. an ad network) and are often used as a tracking 
mechanism for advertising purposes.6 In the world 
of AdExchanges, such as Google’s AdX, this issue 
is complicated further given the complex array of 
players.7 More importantly, reference to the term 
‘cookie’ in this text comprises of all variations, 
including the more controversial ‘flash’ cookies (also 
referred to as Locally Shared Objects). Although this 
form of cookie has serious technical advantages over 
the standard HTTP cookies (and has raised issues 
regarding ‘respawning’), they are both placed 
and accessed on the terminal equipment of users 
and are fundamentally subject to the same legal 
requirements.8
5 The article will analyse the applicable legal 
framework, the legal requirements imposed by 
this framework, the difficulties surrounding the 
definition of consent, and the alternatives and 
supplements to the current EU Data Protection 
edifice. Reference will be made to the current EU 
Data Protection framework in the form of the Data 
Protection Directive and the E-Privacy Directive 
(as amended). Specific attention will also be 
given to the Data Protection reform package and, 
more specifically, the proposed Data Protection 
Regulation. 
B. The scope of the EU Data 
Protection Framework - 
Behavioural Advertising
6 Data Protection is a distinctively European 
innovation that has been received outside the 
EU with varying degrees of success.9 The current 
framework owes its origins to developments, such as 
the 1980 OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy 
and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, the 1981 
Council of Europe Convention on data protection, 
and the 1990 UN guidelines.10 The adoption of such 
provisions is hardly surprising given the historical 
context in which the European supranational 
cooperation originated.11 However, there are two 
other factors which have proven decisive. First, 
the ubiquitous development of technology and the 
supranational challenges that this involves.Second, 
the need to facilitate the free movement of personal 
data within the Community and to resolve conflicts 
arising from differing national regimes.12 Although 
there have been clear technological advances which 
have precipitated legal development, the core of 
the EU framework has remained constant and the 
essence of the data protection edifice has remained 
straightforward.13 This section of the analysis will 
introduce the key instruments and examine their 
scope in relation to OBA. 
I. Data Protection as a 
Primary Source
7 Data protection is a complex issue that has 
traditionally been associated with the concept 
of privacy within the context of personal data 
processing. However, as observed by Borghi et al.: 
‘at least under EU law, privacy and data protection are distinct, 
yet complementary, fundamental legal rights. They derive their 
normative force from values that—although at times coincidental 
and interacting in a variety of ways—may be conceptualized 
independently.’14 
8 This position has allowed data protection to 
automatically trump other interests and gives it 
a status that cannot be traded-off for economic 
benefits.15 The identification of data protection as a 
key personal right of the citizens of the Union was 
confirmed through the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. 
Article 39 TEU and Article 16 TFEU provide specific 
provisions relating to data protection. Article 16, in 
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particular, promotes the data protection provision 
to a ‘provision of general application’ under Title 
II, alongside other EU fundamental principles, 
and also imposes an obligation on the legislator to 
establish a clear and unequivocal legal framework 
for data protection.16 In addition, the Lisbon Treaty 
also formally recognised the binding legal status of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union and provided specific provisions relating to 
the legal significance of the European Convention of 
Human Rights (ECHR). Article 8 of the Charter (the 
right to Data Protection) and Article 8 of the ECHR 
(the right to private life) are of clear importance in 
this regard.17 
II. Introducing the Secondary Sources
9 There are two specific pieces of EU legislation which 
perform a key role in the data processing monitoring 
regime of the Union: first, Directive 95/46/EC (the 
Data Protection Directive), and second, Directive 
2002/58/EC (the e-Privacy Directive including the 
reforms implemented by Directive 2009/136/EC). 
Essentially, the e-Privacy Directive provides a ‘sector-
specific regime’18 which operates as the lex specialis 
vis-a-vis the lex generalis requirements provided for 
by the Data Protection Directive.19 In addition, the 
proposed reform of Data Protection Directive (via the 
General Data Protection Regulation20) provides key 
points of analysis. The proposed Regulation signifies 
the first attempt at revising the data protection rules 
since the Directive went into effect. As Rooney notes, 
changes are needed, as the Data Protection Directive 
is outdated and ill-equipped to deal with modern 
technology.21 Each of these sources will now be 
analysed.
1. The Data Protection Directive
10 The Data Protection Directive requires MSs to adopt 
legislation regulating the processing and movement 
of personal data.22 As noted by van der Sloot et al., it 
is clear from Article 2(d) that ‘[t]he applicability of 
the Directive is triggered when “personal data” are 
“processed” under the authority of the “controller” 
of the personal data.’23 Under the terms of this 
Directive, data subjects are guaranteed certain rights 
vis-a-vis their personal data, while data controllers 
are subject to strict rules and regulations in relation 
to their data processing activities.24 This section will 
analyse three particular questions that will help 
determine the applicability of the Directive. First, 
does the data used in OBA fall into the classification 
of personal data? Second, does the subsequent use of 
this data for the purposes of OBA result in ‘processing’ 
under the terms of the Directive? And finally, in the 
context of OBA, who is the data controller? 
a.) Does the data used in OBA fall into 
the classification of personal data? 
11 According to Article 2(a): 
‘“personal data” shall mean any information relating to an 
identified or identifiable natural person (“data subject”); an 
identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or 
indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number 
or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, 
mental, economic, cultural or social identity’. 
12 In order to assess whether a particular person is 
identifiable, all methods likely and reasonable 
should be taken into consideration.25 
13 The Directive further distinguishes between sensitive 
and non-sensitive data, with the former incurring 
a stricter regime. These ‘special categories of data’ 
require explicit consent from the data subject in 
order to be processed. This distinction between 
common and ‘special categories’ (sensitive) personal 
data is retained in the proposed Regulation and this 
raises clear concerns. The choice of distinguishing 
the categories of data and the further listing of the 
categories of sensitive personal data is restrictive, 
as it does not allow the flexibility needed to cope 
with technological development. In the age of big 
data, analysis-intensive processing methods have 
blurred the lines between these data categories.26 
The designation of cookies into a particular 
classification of data type is of clear importance. In 
order to understand the impact of the Directive on 
behavioural advertising, one must first consider how 
cookies should be classified.27 Businesses involved in 
behavioural targeting often maintain that privacy 
legislation does not apply, as specific persons cannot 
be traced.  This is based on the assumption that users 
remain anonymous, as they are only identifiable 
through the issued tracking cookie. However, in 
legal terms this notion is not completely accurate.28 
14 The Article 29 Working Party opinion on behavioural 
advertising observes that targeted marketing clearly 
falls within the scope of the Directive for two 
particular reasons. First, the use of cookies normally 
involves the processing of unique identifiers and 
the collection of the IP addresses, which allows the 
tracking of particular machines (even when dynamic 
IP addresses are used). Second, the information that 
is collected relates to the users’ characteristics, and 
this is used to influence their behaviour. This view 
is further established if one considers the capacity 
for profiles to be linked with directly identifiable 
information given by the data subjects (for example 
registration details). The Article 29 Working 
Party observes that ‘mergers, data losses and the 
increasing availability on the Internet of personal 
data, in combination with IP addresses,’ are other 
scenarios that can lead to identification.29 
15 There is still strong debate as to whether IP 
addresses should be classified as personal data.30 
At a fundamental level, this is reflected in Court 
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decisions. In EMI & Ors v Eircom Ltd [2010],31 Charleton 
J in the Irish High Court concluded that IP addresses 
do not amount to personal data under the terms of 
the Data Protection Directive. In contrast, one year 
after Charleton J’s judgement, the CJEU in Scarlet 
v Sabam found that IP addresses are classified as 
personal data, as they allow users to be directly 
identified.32 The Article 29 Working Party have 
clearly stated on a number of occasions that IP 
addresses constitute personal data under the 
terms of the Directive, as they can be traced to a 
natural person with the cooperation of the internet 
provider.33 With increasingly powerful processing 
mechanisms, the identity of users can frequently be 
ascertained through the analysing of large quantities 
of data linked to IP addresses and other seemingly 
anonymous data.34 A particularly obvious example 
where such information may be retrieved is found 
in relation to so-called vanity searches.35 However, it 
must be acknowledged that there are exceptions to 
this and not all IP addresses can be effectively linked 
to a user (for example, computers that are used by 
multiple users). The Court of Justice may have been 
handed the opportunity to finally clarify the law 
in this regard with the recent referral of question 
by the German Court on the legal classification of 
IP addresses as personal data.36 This case should 
be watch carefully, as it should provide detailed 
guidance on this issue.
16 The Article 29 Working Party is also of the opinion 
that cookies, in themselves, (even when IP addresses 
are not siphoned) still constitute personal data. In 
its assessment of the concept of personal data, the 
Working Party found that names are not always 
a necessary means of identifying individuals, as 
there are alternative methods of distinguishing an 
individual from other members of a group.37 As such, 
‘unlike in the case of IP addresses, the Working Party 
does not consider the ability to access a name as a 
criterion for qualifying a cookie as personal data.’38 
Instead, the mere accessing of the user’s machine 
suffices. Under the terms of the draft Regulation 
the definition of personal data has been altered to 
include ‘online identifiers’ in the list of examples 
that may be used to identify an individual.39 It 
appears that in the proposed legislative update 
cookies will be specifically included as personal data 
under the terms of the Regulation. Even in the much 
more liberal landscape provided for in the US, the 
FTC found in a consultation document on the self-
regulation of behavioural advertising a tendency to 
classify IP addresses and cookies that are used for 
behavioural targeting the same as ‘regular’ directly 
identifying personal data.40 Hence, the applicability 
of the Data Protection Directive should be assumed 
as relevant when applied to OBA. Moreover, the 
use of cookies for tracking purposes results in the 
creation of a personal data user profile.
b.) Does the subsequent use of 
this data for the purposes of 
OBA result in ‘processing’ under 
the terms of the Directive? 
17 Article 2(b) states that: 
‘For the purposes of this Directive… “processing of personal data” 
(“processing”) shall mean any operation or set of operations 
which is performed upon personal data… ’ 
18 This provides an extremely broad definition of 
processing, which includes almost everything that 
can be done with personal data. It is, therefore, 
unlikely that the manipulation of data for the 
purposes of behavioural advertising would not 
come under the provisions of the Data Protection 
Directive. 
c.) In the context of OBA who 
is the data controller? 
19 Article 2(d) defines the concept of data controller. 
It states that: 
‘“controller” shall mean the natural or legal person, public 
authority, agency or any other body which alone or jointly with 
others determines the purposes and means of the processing of 
personal data…’
20 This provides a clear and precise separation 
in responsibility. As observed by De Hert and 
Papakonstantinou, the traditional approach to data 
processing is for the most part maintained in the 
draft regulation.41 This consists of data controllers 
processing personal information of data subjects 
either through their own means or by contracting a 
third-party data processor. This should be considered 
a failure of the proposals, as the continued insistence 
on the outdated distinction between data controllers 
and data processors does not reflect some of the 
complex actors involved in modern data processing. 
Instead of modifying the data controller and data 
processor definitions in the draft Regulation, the 
Commission ‘chose to strengthen controlling 
instances by placing certain additional obligations 
upon data processors, as well, and acknowledge the 
existence of “joint controllers”.’42 
21 The addition of these further obligations 
strengthens the protection of the data subjects. 
Despite this improvement, the decision to maintain 
the traditional approach to data processing, where 
the roles are easily distinguishable and the data 
processors hold only passive functionality, does 
not reflect the technological realities. In the web 
2.0 era, such a distinction must be viewed as being 
outdated.  With this in mind, ‘perhaps the preferable 
way forward would be for the Commission to boldly 
abolish the notion of “data processors” from its 
Regulation, altogether, and vest the data controller 
title, rights, and obligations upon anyone processing 
personal information, regardless of its means, 
conditions, or purposes.’43
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22 To make matters more complicated, distinguishing 
between the various actors involved in OBA is not 
as simple as it may seem at first glance. It appears 
relatively obvious that Ad Networks, who collect 
and process the information and place and design 
the cookies used to retrieve the information, are 
classified as data controllers. However, the role of 
the publisher is much more complicated. Due to the 
way in which websites are engineered,44 it is the data 
subject’s browser that automatically transmits the 
IP addresses to the ad network provider in order to 
facilitate the sending/reading of the cookies and to 
present the tailored advertising. It is important to 
note that, although the data transfer is caused by 
the browser, it is the publisher’s implementation 
of the website that triggers the transfer, and the 
data subject has no input. Thus, the Article 29 
Working Party finds that publishers have certain 
responsibilities under the Data Protection Directive. 
However: 
‘This responsibility does not cover all the processing activities 
necessary to serve behavioural advertising, for example, the 
processing carried out by the ad network provider consisting 
of building profiles which are then used to serve tailored 
advertising.’45 
23 Instead, their responsibility is restricted to the 
preliminary data processing activities and the initial 
transfer of the IP addresses. The Working Party 
came to this conclusion as ‘the publishers facilitate 
such transfer and co-determine the purposes for 
which it is carried out, i.e. to serve visitors with 
tailored advertising.’46 In addition to the division 
of responsibility between the publisher and the ad 
network, one must also consider the influence of the 
advertiser. Following an ad click, the users’ actions 
may be tracked for conversion statistics and potential 
retargeting. Although this may not be strictly linked 
to the initial ad serving, this information can also 
be shared (in fact, this is often a requirement under 
the Terms of service) with the ad networks, and 
used to improve on future targeted campaigns. This 
certainly raises the notion of ‘co-controllers’.
2. The E-Privacy Directive and ‘Cookies’
24 According to Recital 10 of the E-Privacy Directive, 
the Data Protection Directive applies ‘to all matters 
concerning protection of fundamental rights and 
freedoms which are not specifically covered by the 
provisions of this Directive, including the obligations 
on the controller and the rights of individuals.’ In 
an analysis of the interplay between both of these 
Directives in a behavioural advertising context, the 
Article 29 Working Party observed that the Data 
Protection Directive has full applicability, with the 
exception of the provisions that are specifically 
addressed in the E-Privacy Directive. This mainly 
corresponds to the legal grounds for data processing 
found in Article 7 of the Data Protection Directive. The 
remaining requirements under the Data Protection 
Directive (including the principles regarding data 
quality, the data subject’s rights, confidentiality and 
security of the processing and international data 
transfers) have full applicability.47  The E-Privacy 
Directive provides the specific rules relating to the 
processing of personal data and privacy protection, 
in relation to the electronic communications 
sector.48 Of particular importance is Article 5(3), 
which applies when a provider is accessing or storing 
information on a user’s computer remotely.  
25 As amended, this provision now states that: 
‘Member States shall ensure that the storing of information, or the 
gaining of access to information already stored, in the terminal 
equipment of a subscriber or user is only allowed on condition 
that the subscriber or user has given his or her consent, having 
been provided with clear and comprehensive information in 
accordance with Directive 95/46/EC, inter alia about the purposes 
of the processing.’
26 The Article 29 Working Party has observed that this 
article has full applicability to tracking cookies as 
they can be classified as ‘information’ stored on the 
terminal equipment of the user which are accessed 
by the ad networks. Accordingly, the placing and 
any subsequent use of such cookies (or similar 
technologies irrespective of type) will require 
compliance with Article 5(3).49 
3. Privacy Framework overlap and 
the Proposed Amendments
27 In contrast to the Data Protection Directive, Article 
5(3) of the E-Privacy Directive does not relate 
specifically to ‘personal data’ but, instead, refers more 
generally to ‘information’. In order to invoke the 
applicability of the Directive, it is not a prerequisite 
that the information is classified as personal under 
the terms of the Data Protection Directive.50 This 
is expressed in Recital 24 which provides that the 
‘terminal equipment of users… and any information 
stored on such equipment are part of the private 
sphere of these users requiring protection under 
the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’. Hence, 
information that is considered to be in the ‘private 
sphere of the users’ triggers the application of Article 
5(3) and not if the data is classified as personal. The 
applicability of the Data Protection Directive is not 
affected by the E-Privacy Directive. In essence, one 
is required to make a clear distinction between the 
placing of the cookie and the actual use of the data 
recorded by this mechanism.51 However, from the 
discussion supra it is clear that in all probability the 
cookies do fall into the category of personal data. 
Thus, in relation to behavioural advertising, both 
Directives appear to have relevance. 
28 Article 20 of the proposed Regulation introduces a 
provision which deals directly with user profiling. 
The addition of a provision on profiling would be a 
significant step, as it would remove the ambiguity 
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surrounding the applicability of the data protection 
edifice. This also recognises the development of 
technology that is not reliant on the accessing of 
the terminal equipment of the user. This addition 
is also aided through the proposed strengthening 
of the data minimisation principles under Article 
5. Indeed, ‘[t]he strengthening of this principle is 
necessary in order to address the current trends of 
data harvesting and data mining used for profiling 
consumers and which involve large amounts of 
personal data being collected.’52
29 Having examined the scope of the EU Data Protection 
Framework, it is now necessary to analyse the 
legal requirements it imposes upon behavioural 
advertising. These categories will be assessed in 
detail in the proceeding part of the analysis.
C. The legal requirements 
imposed by the EU Data 
Protection Framework
30 The applicability of both Directives to OBA, 
essentially, opens up three important categories 
of legal requirements. First, those relating to 
information dissemination to the users; second, 
those relating to consent; and finally, the further 
obligations laid down in the Data Protection 
Directive.53 These requirements involve a high 
degree of overlap between the E-Privacy provisions 
and the lex generis requirements imposed by the 
Data Protection Directive. It is important to note 
that the Data Protection Directive has both general 
applicability to issues not covered by the E-Privacy 
Directive and specific impact when referred to by 
the terms of the E-Privacy provisions. The various 
requirements and their specific application will now 
be assessed in detail. 
I. Interpreting Article 5(3) - 
legal obligations for Online 
Behavioural Advertising
31 In the opinion of the Article 29 Working Party, it 
is clear from a literal interpretation of Article 5(3) 
that prior consent is required before the information 
can be placed or processed. For the consent to be 
informed, prior information regarding the purposes 
of the cookie must have been given to the user.54 
It is clear that these requirements are cumulative 
in nature.55 The key point of contention in relation 
to behavioural advertising is what constitutes 
unambiguous consent. However, perhaps it is 
prudent to, first, briefly analyse what amounts 
to adequate dissemination, in order to satisfy the 
‘informed’ element of the consent requirement.
1. Information Dissemination
a.) Type of Information Required
32 Article 5(3) of the E-Privacy Directive declares 
that users must be provided with information ‘in 
accordance with Directive 95/46/EC, inter alia about 
the purposes of the processing’. As such, one is 
required to refer to Article 10 of the Data Protection 
Directive. In relation to OBA, the users should be 
clearly informed about the purposes of the cookies 
and, hence, that they will allow the tracking of the 
users’ visits to other websites, the advertisements 
they have been shown and which ones they have 
clicked.56 Significantly, under the terms of the 
proposed changes in the draft Regulation, Article 
14 provides a list of information that must be 
provided to the data subjects. In addition to the 
information required in the current Directive, the 
proposed Regulation specifies the period for which 
the data will be stored, the right to object to the 
processing, and the right to lodge a complaint with 
the supervisory body and the contact details of that 
body.57 Interestingly, the new provision specifically 
dealing with profiling (Article 20) is not mentioned 
in Article 14. The BEUC (European Consumer 
Agency Organisation) in its assessment of the 
article observed that ‘this provision should echo the 
inclusion of a specific article dealing with profiling 
(Article 20) by requiring information about tracking 
and profiling purposes, and its consequences on 
individuals to be added under Article 14.1 b.’58 
However, Article 20 does provide that information 
dissemination is required.  More specifically, in 
addition to the requirements laid down in Article 14, 
this should include ‘information as to the existence 
of processing’ for the purposes of profiling and also 
the ‘envisaged effects of such processing on the data 
subjects.’ These changes reflect the overall move 
towards the principle of transparency as provided 
for in Article 5 of the proposed amendments.
b.) How should the information 
be presented?
33 It is important that the information is presented in a 
user-friendly manner so as not to negate its influence. 
This reflects the concern that the information 
should be easily accessible and understandable and 
‘should not be ‘‘hidden’’ in a link at the bottom of a 
page referring to a vague and unreadable privacy 
policy.’59 Accordingly, there should be a simple 
explanation of the uses of the information gathered 
by the cookie analysis. Recital 25 of the E-Privacy 
Directive stipulates that notices should be displayed 
in a ‘clear and comprehensive’ manner. The Article 
29 Working Party suggests that ‘Statements such 
as “advertisers and other third parties may also 
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use their own cookies or action tags” are clearly 
not sufficient.’60 Recital 66 goes on to state that the 
method for refusing cookies should be ‘as user-
friendly as possible’. The Directive does not provide 
specifics as to how this may be achieved and this is 
reflected in the varying implementations of cookie 
notices. In keeping with the general move towards 
more transparent data processing, Article 11 of the 
draft regulation contains a specific provision in 
relation to the communication of information. This 
movement towards transparency and the provision 
of clear communication is also aided through recital 
32 of the proposal, which states that privacy policies 
are required to be as clear and transparent as possible 
and should not contain ‘hidden or disadvantageous 
clauses’.61 The proposed developments vis-a-vis the 
information requirements are clearly designed to 
strengthen the position of the data subject. This is 
further fortified in the draft amendments to the 
concept of consent.
2. Unambiguous Consent
34 Consent is a complex issue that raises clear difficulties 
in relation to the EU data protection framework.62 
The preliminary obligatory requirement for consent 
effectively renders the other legitimate interests 
for data processing, as provided for under Article 
7 of the Data Protection Directive, inapplicable. 
Accordingly, consent is a prerequisite for the 
legitimate placing of cookies and processing of 
cookie data. Nevertheless, it is important to note that 
with the potential development of tracking methods 
not linked to users’ terminal equipment, the other 
justifications for legitimate data processing may 
have future applicability. However, as mentioned 
supra, the draft Regulation seems to predict such 
a progression by providing for a specific tracking 
provision. Given the current dependency on the 
accessing of the terminal equipment of the users 
in order to effectively track online behaviour, the 
requirements provided for under Article 5(3) of 
the e-Privacy Directive moderate the relevancy 
of the Data Protection Directive. As such, cookie-
based behavioural advertising is restricted by the 
interpretation and implementation of the concept of 
consent under the Data Protection Directive despite 
the availability of other grounds for legitimate data 
processing in circumstances not involving cookies 
or other forms of client side processing. The 
interpretation of this concept is the key debate in the 
analysis of Online Behavioural Advertising and the 
use of cookies. Given its importance, the difficulties 
surrounding the interpretation of consent will be 
analysed in Section D of this paper in detail. 
II. Further Requirements and the 
Data Protection Directive
35 As previously discussed, there is a clear distinction 
between the personal and sensitive categories of 
data under the current data protection framework 
which is maintained in the draft regulation. 
Under the current provisions, the processing of 
these special categories of data requires explicit 
consent, which contrasts with the requirements 
for ordinary personal data. Given the applicability 
of Article 5(3) of the E-Privacy Directive, it appears 
from the discussion supra that opt-in consent will 
be required for the placing/accessing of cookies 
irrespective of whether the processed information 
is non-personal, personal or sensitive. Therefore, it 
seems that the additional requirements envisaged 
by the proposed Regulation will have already been 
satisfied by the consent requirement under Article 
5(3). However, given the applicability of the Data 
Protection Directive, there are additional obligations 
which must be considered. The requirements that 
are particularly relevant to behavioural advertising 
will now be analysed.
1. Data Quality
36 There are several fair information principles which 
need to be complied with in order to satisfy the 
obligations under the Data Protection Directive. 
The key requirement of the Directive is the vague 
obligation that personal data must be processed 
‘fairly and lawfully’. Article 6 of the 1995 Directive 
outlines various conditions that must be satisfied 
by the data controller in relation to data quality. It 
is clear from the Article that processing can only 
take place for legitimate purposes. In its opinion on 
Search Engines, the Article 29 Working Party has 
stated that ‘some purposes, such as “improvement 
of the service” or “the offering of personalised 
advertising” are too broadly defined to offer an 
appropriate framework to judge the legitimacy of 
the purpose.’63 The Working Party observed that 
this was particularly true when the controller also 
mentions additional purposes for the data.64 
37 In relation to behavioural advertising, it must be 
understood that the Working Party’s reference to 
‘personalised advertising’ reflects more the data 
controllers’ explanation of the purposes to the data 
subjects rather than the specificity of the activity in 
itself. This is also indicative of the purpose limitation 
principle which in Article 6(1)(b) ‘prohibits the 
processing of personal data which is not compatible 
with the purposes that legitimised the initial 
collection.’65 This prevents the re-use of information 
for purposes other than those originally specified 
to the data subject. In order for the repurposing 
of the collected personal data to take place, one is 
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required to satisfy one of the legitimate grounds for 
processing under Article 7.  
38 Article 6 further stipulates that data should be 
accurate and updated if necessary. All reasonable 
steps must be taken to ensure that inaccurate and/
or incomplete data are erased or modified while 
remaining conscious of the purposes for which they 
are being processed. This presents a clear problem 
in relation to OBA in that, although analytics 
systems can ignore particular false positives, certain 
inaccuracies are unavoidable.  Furthermore, Article 
6(1)(e) outlines the retention principle, which 
requires the deletion of data where it is no longer 
necessary for the purposes it was gathered. This is an 
indication of the data minimisation principle which, 
although not expressly provided for, is implied by 
certain requirements in the Directive.66 The principle 
provides that only the minimum amount of data 
required to adequately perform the processing 
should be gathered.  This principle has been 
recognised by the Court of Justice which has found 
that the Directive ‘must necessarily be interpreted 
in the light of fundamental rights, which, according 
to settled case-law, form an integral part of the 
general principles of law whose observance the 
Court ensures.’67 This reflects the overall balancing 
of data protection with other fundamental rights, 
both under the terms of the Charter and the ECHR, 
and, hence, the importance of the principle of 
proportionality in this regard. 
39 There have been a number of key developments in this 
regard in the draft regulation. These developments 
are understood to be necessary to address the issues 
associated with the current trends in data mining 
where large data sets are being analysed in the 
profiling of data subjects.68 The draft Regulation in 
Article 6(f) prohibits processing in the interest of 
controllers where the fundamental rights of data 
subjects require data protection. Furthermore, as 
part of the draft proposals, Article 5 has clarified the 
principles relating to data processing by expressly 
providing for the principles of transparency, data 
minimisation and controller liability, which are 
currently only been implicitly referred to (see 
discussion supra).69 Although these principles have 
been around for 25 years, it is only now that they 
have been confirmed in the draft legislative text.70 
2. Data Subjects’ Rights
40 Data subjects have the rights of access, rectification, 
erasure and to object as enunciated under Article 12 
and 14 of the Data Protection Directive; and, these 
rights should be respected by the data controller. 
In relation to OBA, this affords the data subject 
the right to access the information gathered by 
the ad network (i.e. their profile), to demand the 
modification or deletion of this profile, and to 
object to any further profiling. Certain Ad Networks 
provide these services and allow the data subject 
to modify and erase interest categories.71 Under 
the terms of the draft Regulation, the concepts of 
rectification and erasure are elevated in importance. 
These concepts are placed in a new section (Section 
3), which provides for the right to rectification in 
Article 16 (elements of Article 12(b) in the current 
Directive), right to be forgotten and the right to 
erasure in Article 17 (elements of Article 12(b) in 
current Directive) and the right to data portability 
in Article 18. As noted by Savin, the latter of these 
‘which is a new right, consists of the right to obtain 
a copy of the data from the controller for the further 
use by the data subject.’72 
3. Additional Obligations
41 It should be further noted that the obligations related 
to confidentiality and security of the processing are 
also relevant. Article 17 states that ‘Member States 
shall provide that the controller must implement 
appropriate technical and organisational measures 
to protect personal data….’ As observed by the 
Working Party, to comply with this provision ad 
network providers are required ‘to implement state 
of the art technical and organisational measures 
to ensure the security and confidentiality of the 
information.’73 Under Article 30(3) of the proposed 
Regulation, the security of personal data appears 
to have been elevated along with the concepts 
of privacy by default and design. As noted by 
Hildebrandt and Tielemans: 
‘By enacting these types of duties as legal obligations the EU 
legislator inaugurates examples of what has been coined as 
legal protection by design (LPbD), confronting us with a new 
articulation of legal norms: next to unwritten and written law, 
we now have something like digital law.’74
42 Article 18 is also applicable and requires data 
controllers to notify the data protection authorities 
of their data processing activities (unless they are 
exempt).  Article 28 of the draft proposals replaces 
the cumbersome notification requirement with 
the obligation to maintain documentation of any 
processing activity. Under Article 28(2) the relevant 
pieces of documentation that controllers need to 
record are noted. The minimum requirements 
stipulate that the contact details for the controller 
and the data protection officers, the types of personal 
data being processed, the recipients (or categories 
of recipients) of the personal data, the purposes 
of the data processing, possible transfers to third 
countries and the relevant retention periods need to 
be maintained. As noted by the BEUC report this will 
‘make the checking by Data Protection Authorities 
easier and help improve monitoring of compliance 
and enforcement.’75 
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43 Finally, in relation to international data transfers, 
Articles 25 and 26 are also relevant. Article 25 
provides that the Commission may ban data transfer 
to countries that fail to provide ‘an adequate level of 
protection’ of data privacy rights. Article 26 lists a 
number of derogations and provides that a transfer 
to a country that ‘does not ensure an adequate level 
of protection’ may occur if the controller enters a 
contractual arrangement that guarantees adequate 
safeguards for the protection of the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of the data subject.76 In the 
context of OBA, international data transfers have 
particular importance given the transferability of the 
gathered information. Without robust protections, 
profiling practices prohibited by EU law could still 
be performed on EU users if their information was 
transferred to a third country for data processing. The 
draft regulation recognises the growing importance 
of international data transfers and reflects this new 
reality by abandoning the presumption that personal 
data cannot be transferred without an adequate level 
of protection. Instead, the Commission has opted 
to outline a number of requirements which must 
be satisfied before any such a transfer can occur.77 
These modifications are provided in Articles 40-
45 and include examples of the criteria that the 
commission would use in their assessment of the 
adequacy of the level of protection provided by the 
third country.  This is a very topical area, especially 
given the recent challenge to the legitimacy of such 
transfers to the US.78
D. Difficulties defining consent 
44 Following our discussion of the three categories of 
legal requirements, it is clear that prior informed 
consent provides the crux of the debate regarding the 
effective regulation and advancement of responses 
to the use of cookies as tracking technologies in 
behavioural advertising. The additional requirements 
imposed by the Data Protection Directive are 
predicated on this preliminary consideration. 
However, the failure to find consensus on a common 
definition of consent renders the existing framework 
divisive and ambiguous.  
I. Consent in its current form
45 Article 8 of the Charter specifically recognises 
consent as the key condition for the protection of 
personal data. Behavioural advertising has based 
itself on the ability to place cookies on users’ 
terminal equipment. If users were unhappy with 
this, they were required to opt-out (provided they 
knew how).79 Under the amended Article 5(3), it is 
clear that informed prior consent is required before 
any such technology is used or even installed.80 
Azim-Khan and Millard have observed that ‘[t]he 
requirement for explicit prior consent seems to have 
spelt the end of the “opt-out” regime....’81 The change 
implemented by Directive 2009/136 provides a clear 
departure by legislating for an ‘opt-in’ requirement 
by default82and was a ‘bold step’.83 However, there 
is still strong criticism of this position from certain 
sectors.84 Article 2(f) provides that ‘“consent” 
by a user or subscriber corresponds to the data 
subject’s consent in Directive 95/46/EC.’ Hence, the 
interpretation of consent provided for under the 
Data Protection Directive is applicable. Article 2(h) 
of the Data Protection Directive states that ‘”the 
data subject’s consent” shall mean any freely given 
specific and informed indication of his wishes by 
which the data subject signifies his agreement to 
personal data relating to him being processed.’ 
46 Furthermore, Article 7(a) of the Directive states 
that ‘Member States shall provide that personal 
data may be processed only if… the data subject 
has unambiguously given their consent’. This 
appears to be an extremely strict interpretation. 
Recital 66 of the amended E-Privacy Directive 
appears, however, to allow some room for the 
interpretations of the national legislators and 
advertisers in the interpretation of what constitutes 
consent.85 The recital states that ‘[w]here it is 
technically possible and effective, in accordance 
with the relevant provisions of Directive 95/46/EC, 
the user’s consent to processing may be expressed 
by using the appropriate settings of a browser or 
other application.’ This appears to permit the use 
of browser settings to indicate consent to cookies.86 
As virtually all browsers have privacy settings 
that allow users to control cookie usage, the major 
talking point is whether data subjects’ consent 
may be inferred from pre-existing browser privacy 
settings.87 Despite its focus on the issue of consent 
and cookies, the amended E-Privacy Directive failed 
to effectively clarify the interpretation of implicit 
consent with respect to browser settings.88
47 The Article 29 Working Party, in its opinion on 
behavioural advertising, observed that consent 
via default browser settings is unlikely to meet 
the requirements under the data protection 
framework. This is for three particular reasons. 
First, the ‘respawning’ of flash cookies circumvents 
the deletion of cookies and allows the bypassing of 
the data subject’s choice in their browser settings.89 
Second, consent via browser settings implies user 
acceptance to future processing, conceivably 
without any knowledge of the purposes or uses of 
the cookie. Third: 
‘based on the definition and requirements for valid consent 
ex Article 2 (h) of Directive 95/46/EC, generally speaking data 
subjects cannot be deemed to have consented simply because they 
acquired/used a browser or other application which by default 
enables the collection and processing of their information.’90
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48 This is due to the fact that data subjects, in general, 
are unaware of tracking and, additionally, are not 
always aware of how to adjust the browser privacy 
settings. The lack of user understanding is difficult 
to refute and it is, perhaps, a fallacy to think data 
subject inaction provides an unambiguous indication 
of their wishes.91 In a study conducted in the US by 
McDonald and Cranor, the authors noted that ‘[o]
ne participant said behavioral advertising sounded 
like something her “paranoid” friend would dream 
up, but not something that would ever occur in 
real life.’92 In a similar study, Smit, Van Noort and 
Voorveld concluded that their findings relating to 
general users’ lack of understanding of tracking 
technology raised an important question: namely, 
‘what does informed consent mean within a not-
well-informed audience?’93 Accordingly, for those 
involved in OBA, in theory it appears to be difficult to 
avoid the opt-in requirement.94 This has not always 
been reflected in practice due to the ambiguity 
provided for by implied consent.
II. Explicit Consent and the 
Proposed amendments 
49 Member State implementation of the changes 
necessitated by the cookie Directive was initially 
inconsistent95 and this division reflects the 
dichotomy in opinions in relation to this debate.96 
The ENISA Report on online behavioural tracking 
observes that while ‘[s]ome states have suggested 
existing browser settings would remain adequate, 
through the legal fiction that they convey “implicit 
consent”‘, the majority view favours requiring 
explicit, affirmative consent for each website.’97 
The ambiguity surrounding the interpretation of 
consent is a definite stumbling block to effective and 
consistent monitoring of OBA within the Union. In 
their recent article, de Lima and Legge have noted 
two particular criticisms of EU law in this regard. 
First, in relation to the ambiguous interpretation of 
the laws. Second, the failure to provide an effective 
balance between commercial and individual needs. 
The proposed Regulation has confirmed the EU’s 
move towards an opt-in regime which ‘is intended 
to strengthen consumer data protection rights 
by facilitating individual control over personal 
information.’98 The draft adds a provision requiring 
all consent to be explicit. Previously, explicit consent 
was only required for the processing of sensitive 
data.99 
50 The commentary supplementing the Regulation 
clarified that this modification was ‘added to avoid 
confusing parallelism with “unambiguous” consent 
and in order to have one single and consistent 
definition of consent, ensuring the awareness 
of the data subject that, and to what, he or she 
gives consent.’100 The modification of the consent 
requirement provided for in Article 7 of the draft 
is supplemented by Recital 25 which provides, ‘[c]
onsent should be given explicitly by any appropriate 
method enabling a freely given specific and informed 
indication of the data subject’s wishes…. Silence or 
inactivity should therefore not constitute consent.’ 
The effect of these provisions is to effectively 
eliminate the enforceability of implied consent 
through default settings by requiring an express 
indication of consent by the user. According to 
Article 7(4) and Recital 34 consent is invalid where 
‘there is a clear imbalance between the data subject 
and the controller.’101 Article 7(3) provides that the 
data subject has ‘the right to withdraw his or her 
consent at any time.’ The burden of proof rests with 
the data controller in all situations.102
51 Finally, it should be noted that the advancement 
of consent cannot be viewed in isolation but, 
instead, is indicative of the overall move towards 
counterbalancing ‘the benefits of technological 
advancements and risks for individual data 
protection by complementing the legal framework 
with the principle of ‘privacy by default and by 
design’.103 Article 23 of the proposed Regulation 
provides that: 
‘[h]aving regard to the state of the art and the cost of 
implementation, the controller shall, both at the time of the 
determination of the means for processing and at the time of 
the processing itself, implement appropriate technical and 
organisational measures and procedures in such a way that the 
processing will meet the requirements of this Regulation and 
ensure the protection of the rights of the data subject.’ 
52 This provision aims at encouraging the development 
of user-friendly methods of incorporating privacy 
in the overall primary design and code in order to 
move towards the notion of user empowerment. This 
could impose a heavy burden upon existing business 
models that would need a complete overhaul to 
comply with the proposed provisions. Nevertheless, 
the development of this concept reflects the EU’s 
insistence upon explicit consent and the struggle 
to find an effective and simple means for its 
implementation.
53 The move towards explicit consent in the proposed 
Regulation would remove some of the ambiguities 
surrounding the interpretation of this concept. 
Nevertheless, it is unclear whether this development 
is to be welcomed. An analysis of the potential 
problems associated with explicit consent is 
necessary. 
III. Defining Consent and the 
associated difficulties
54 The proposed Regulation’s emphasis on explicit 
consent indicates the assumption that the opt-in 
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version provides a stronger protection for users. 
At first glance it may seem that such a robust 
interpretation is justified. However as noted by Tene: 
‘individuals explicitly consent to agreements all the time 
without such consent being informed, voluntary, or meaningful. 
Individuals sign boilerplate contracts (e.g., with banks or 
insurance companies), execute clickwrap agreements and end-
user license agreements (EULAs), and download apps granting 
whatever permissions are asked of them.’104
55 This is an interesting argument that possibly 
reflects the societal realities. US Chief Justice John 
Roberts has famously indicated that he does not 
read boilerplate provisions.105 It is perhaps fair 
to conclude that a large proportion of users fail 
to take into account the terms of standard form 
contracts online. Many commentators have argued 
that the legalese used in these agreements renders 
them incomprehensible and thus irrelevant to the 
users.106 Accordingly, the true value of providing 
the user with the information may be questionable. 
Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning in this regard 
the proposed regulation’s emphasis on user-friendly 
information dissemination.    
1. Economic justifications for 
information ‘free-flow’ 
56 Richard Posner, writing extra judiciously and in a US 
context, has offered some economic justifications 
to allow the free flow of information.  Posner has 
observed that these privacy harms are arguably 
unsubstantial vis-a-vis the economic and societal 
benefits which tracking offers.107 Moreover, to 
render consent difficult to procure may prevent 
entities from engaging in those activities given the 
associated costs. As per Solove, ‘the result might be 
to restrict uses of data in a formalistic manner that 
fails to distinguish beneficial from harmful uses.’108 
However, one cannot forget that users are not only 
consumers but are also citizens of the Union, and that 
they should be afforded the protections provided 
in the EU primary and secondary legal sources. It 
must be acknowledged that there is a fundamental 
difference in the way data protection and privacy 
are viewed in the US and the EU. 
57 Although Posner and the proponents of the economic 
argument make a strong case, it is uncertain whether 
dividing the benefit of data access so clearly in 
favour of commercial gains truly benefits and 
reflects societal interests. Nevertheless, as noted by 
Tene et al.: 
‘Excessive reliance on opt-ins inevitably will disrupt user interfaces 
and encumber individuals with repetitive prompts, which they 
will be eager to click through to reach their destination. This will 
be exacerbated by the requirement in Article 7(2) of the GDPR 
that consent to data processing must be unbundled from other 
agreements.’109 
58 The result would be a poor user experience that 
nullifies any positive effects of opt-in consent. The 
more common cookie notices become, the more 
mundane, easily dismissed and ineffective the 
obligation to consent is rendered. 
59 Accordingly, this issue appears to be somewhat of a 
double-edged sword that will result in dissatisfaction 
in some form, irrespective of the decision taken.  It 
is apparent that explicit opt-in consent places the 
burden on the commercial entities. Nevertheless, 
it is uncertain whether these changes will, in fact, 
have any meaningful impact for the users. The task 
of adequately balancing interests is undoubtedly 
difficult. In assessing this issue, one has to realise that 
the commercial and data protection interests are 
clearly polarised. As outlined above, this manifests 
itself most notably in the debate surrounding the 
varied interpretation of consent.  This ambiguity 
is reflected in many of the solutions presented and 
remains a clear stumbling block which has proven 
extremely difficult to navigate. 
2. Choosing defaults
60 The key difficulty in this regard is the choosing of 
a default position. In her article, Willis analyses 
this issue and refers to what she classifies as ‘sticky 
defaults’.110 Willis’ perspective centres on the 
importance of default positions in manipulating 
user behaviour. A default position in the context of 
OBA refers to the standard and modifiable consent 
settings (i.e. opt-in or opt-out) offered to a user. 
Three clear assumptions from behavioural economic 
literature form the basis of her analysis: 
‘[f]irst, that any default chosen will be “sticky,” meaning that 
more consumers stay with the default than would explicitly 
choose to do so if forced to make a choice. Second, that those 
consumers with a preference for the opt-out position —and only 
those consumers—will opt out. Third, that where firms oppose 
the default position, they will be forced to explain it in the course 
of trying to convince consumers to opt out, resulting in well-
informed decisions by consumers.’111 
61 These assumptions have clearly motivated industry 
responses to opt-in consent. Although there are a 
series of commentaries relevant to how and why 
default positions are sticky, this does not fall within 
the scope of this text.112 Instead, it is sufficient to say 
that the decisions relating to default settings have 
clear behaviour manipulating effects. Accordingly, 
it is no surprise that the move towards an opt-in 
version of consent has resulted in vastly differing 
interpretations. The purpose of the rest of this article 
is to examine the proposed solutions. The analysis 
contends that the future regulation of OBA lies in a 
legislative system that is supplemented by clever 
code. This is a manifestation of the concept of Privacy 
by Design, as proposed in the draft Regulation. It is 
thought that this approach could help circumvent 
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be compliant.116 Aside from the clear opt-out by 
default concerns, the WP outlined three additional 
difficulties. First, despite the fact that the opt-out 
cookie prevents further personalised advertising, it 
does not prevent the future accessing and storing of 
information on the user’s terminal. Second, the user 
remains unaware of whether the cookie is retained 
on their computer and indeed the purposes of this 
retention. Third, the decision to install the opt-in 
cookie does not offer the possibility to manage 
previously installed cookies, while at the same 
time it establishes the mistaken assumption that it 
disables tracking.117 Accordingly, the potential value 
of the recommendations is certainly questionable. 
The failure to adequately meet the obligations under 
the legislation reflects the weaknesses associated 
with self-regulation. 
66 Hirsh, in his assessment of the self-regulatory 
approach, has outlined three criticisms.118 First, in 
the balance between the public and commercial 
interests, firms will maintain loyal to their own 
profits as a priority.  Indeed, the Electronic Privacy 
Information Center (EPIC) has observed that the 
self-regulatory efforts of the telecommunications 
industry during the 1990s enrolled approximately 
5 million consumers in comparison to the over 
200 million now registered on the FTC Do-Not-Call 
list. It is probable that this trend would be likely to 
continue in a behavioural advertising context and 
such a prediction appears to hold true to form.119 
Second, these programmes generally lack the 
capacity to force compliance with the guidelines 
against their members. In a US context, the FTC 
has incentivised participation by threatening 
potential legislative intervention.120 This signifies 
the clear impotency of self-regulation to ensure 
compliance and progress. Third, voluntary 
membership will result in companies choosing to 
take advantage of the goodwill generated without 
any particular restriction being imposed by the 
guidelines themselves. This reflects the notion that 
large corporations use self-regulatory innovations 
as mere public relations stunts and this is perhaps 
indicative of the make-up of these organisations. As 
noted by the ENISA report, ‘[a]t present most of the 
largest online advertising and analytics companies 
participate, and most of the smaller ones do not. 
Social networks and content providers are almost 
entirely absent.’121 
67 This scepticism of the industry’s willingness to 
place consumer interests first has been evidenced 
in practice.122 It is clear that this approach is not 
a preferable option, as it lacks the clout to force 
compliance and adequately protect users. However, 
that is not to say that it has no role in the future 
regulation of OBA. There have been some positive 
initiatives associated with user education and 
awareness.123 Nevertheless, commercial interests will 
always outweigh user safety in the eyes of advertising 
the difficulties imposed by the debate surrounding 
the default position of consent.  
E. Alternatives and supplements 
to the EU framework
62 An alternative means of ensuring actual user 
agreement with the placing of tracking software 
(and by extension, the processing of personal data) 
is required. Accordingly, this section will examine 
the means of supplementing the current EU forms 
of regulating in order to effectively guarantee the 
protection of users. The analysis will outline and 
assess the alternatives offered by industry and 
academics and will present a potential solution to 
the problem. 
I. Self-Regulation - A means of 
filling in the Regulatory gap?
63 Although it is argued that the solution lies with 
the concept of Privacy by Design, it is necessary 
to first examine self-regulation as industry 
associations have suggested that it could provide 
a platform upon which compliance with the legal 
requirements could be reached.113 There have 
been some seemingly positive developments 
regarding self-regulatory mechanisms. These have 
focused on the standardisation of approaches not 
explicitly (or ambiguously) regulated by law. It 
should be acknowledged that these methods for 
self-regulation have, for the most part, harmonised 
the approaches in the US and the EU. The Network 
Advertising Initiative (NAI), the Digital Advertising 
Alliance (DAA), the European Advertising Standards 
Alliance (EASA) and the Interactive Advertising 
Bureau Europe (IAB Europe) all impose the same 
core requirements,114 namely: 
1. To provide information regarding their 
practices.
2. Allow users to opt out for behavioural advertising 
(note that this only relates to advertising and 
does not affect other uses).
64 In a speech delivered by Neelie Kroes in 2011 positive 
reference was made to the adoption of the Best 
Practice Recommendation and Framework by the 
EASA and IAB Europe advertising associations.115 
65 Despite outward appearances, the legitimacy and 
legality of the adopted best practices remains 
unclear (especially regarding the opt-out default). 
In its assessment of the framework, the Article 
29 Working Party concluded that the proposals 
failed to adhere to EU law and that they could be 
damaging to the industry if they believed them to 
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agents. Therefore, self-regulatory initiatives should 
be limited to soft policy best practices. 
II. Privacy Enhancing Technologies 
68 Given the widely accepted failure of self-regulation124 
technical solutions have been proffered and developed 
by industry enthusiasts. These technologies which 
are based on the core principles for data protection 
are referred to as Privacy Enhancing Technologies 
(PETs) and have gained increasing popularity in the 
last number of years.125 PETs owe their origins to 
Chaum’s seminal 1981 paper on ‘Mix-Networks’.126 
However, awareness and adoption rates appear to 
have remained low.127 This is perhaps linked to a lack 
of user awareness and also, potentially, the failure 
to provide user friendly interfaces. As observed 
by Mitrou and Karyda, PETs are often application 
or system specific and depend ‘on the underlying 
legal and regulatory framework, on users’ privacy 
awareness and their privacy concerns, as well as on 
the cost and benefits associated with their use.’128 
69 Despite the fact that the implementation of and 
concepts behind these technologies are relatively 
simple, ‘the complexity of the term makes it difficult 
for many stakeholders, individuals, as well as data 
controllers to apprehend their usefulness and, 
therefore, employ them.’129 However, there has been 
large scale development of PETs in the form of plug-
ins that use Tracking Protection Lists to monitor 
and block the placing of cookies on the terminal 
equipment of the users. The difficulty with these 
TPLs is that they are dependent on the effective 
maintenance of the list in order to avoid slipping 
into obsolescence and exposing the users to the risk 
of the newest tracking technologies. 
1. ‘Do Not Track’ – and the 
proliferation of PETs
70 The development of the ‘Do Not Track’ policy and 
technology is a recent example of the proliferation 
of PETs. This proposal aims at enabling ‘users to opt 
out of tracking by (all) websites they do not visit, 
including analytics services, advertising networks, 
and social platforms.’130 It must be understood that 
this is not a blocking technology but, instead, is merely 
a means of alerting publishers and ad networks 
of a user’s wish not to be tracked. Essentially, the 
mechanism inserts a ‘DNT flag’ into the header of 
the user’s browser which is communicated during 
routine exchanges with website servers. If the flag is 
enabled, the user is stating that they do not consent 
to tracking. This does not, in itself, either block the 
placing of cookies or prevent the accessing of cookies 
on the terminal equipment of the user. Hence, the 
mechanism is entirely dependent on its acceptance 
and adoption as a policy by the advertisers. Although 
all of the large browsers offer Do-Not-Track, 
Microsoft sparked some debate with the launch of 
its Internet Browser version 10 by implementing the 
Do-Not-Track as a default feature. 
2. ‘Sticky defaults’ and the DNT debate
71 The problems inherent in the EU framework 
surrounding consent and the notion of ‘sticky 
defaults’ are also prevalent in the Do Not Track 
debate. As noted by Fairfield: 
‘The problem is inherent in the implementation of the DNT flag. 
Do-Not-Track is, logically speaking, a binary flag. The value of 
Do-Not-Track is equal to zero or one. The switch is either “on” or 
“off”. Yet there is a third state in the protocol, “unset,” and the 
unset state must be provided by every software agent designer. 
Given that DNT:1 means that tracking is forbidden, and DNT:O 
means that tracking is permitted, the unset term serves only as 
a gap-filler, a placeholder, a state from which every consumer 
must take action at non-zero cost, in order to reach his or her 
true preference.’131
72 The interpretation of this ‘unset’ state is extremely 
controversial, especially given that the idea appears 
to have had broad support amongst privacy 
enthusiasts. To counteract the DNT momentum, 
advertisers have attempted to reduce its relevance 
by diluting its standards and threatening to 
withdraw support. As noted by Fairfield in a US 
context, the attempts to side-step the purpose of 
the Do-Not-Track policy have focussed on the Digital 
Advertising Alliance’s argument that the policy still 
permits the tracking of users as long as they are not 
targeted with advertisements. This contradicts the 
FTC opinion, which equates Do-Not-Track with Do-
Not-Collect.132 The same arguments have also been 
prevalent in Europe and this has led to the effective 
elimination of this concept as a conceivable means of 
supplementing user protection interests in the EU.133
3. Privacy by design and the future of PETs
73 Nevertheless, the lessons learned in the DNT context 
could be effectively used and developed to inspire 
fresh ideas under the heading of PETs.134 This is 
especially true in applying the principles behind 
the DNT policy in a privacy-by-design context. 
Kirsch in his assessment of this issue proposes the 
adoption of a DNT policy that would encompass a 
legally mandatory browser start-up wizard that 
would explain the two available options (i.e. to allow 
tracking or not). This would require users to make 
a decision before they begin browsing. Individual 
advertisers could then contact the users in order to 
procure an exception excluding them from this rule. 
This approach would clearly satisfy the requirements 
expressed under the data protection framework 
and the proposed Regulation. Under the proposal, 
users would give informed prior consent that would 
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user empowerment and appears to be an improved 
version of the privacy by design proposals described 
above in detail. This goal of user empowerment and, 
thus, data subject control over personal data has also 
been explored from an economic perspective and has 
come to be known as the Proprietary Rights Model.
III. The Proprietary Rights Model
76 The Proprietary Rights Model proposes the direct 
sale of information by users. It is based on the 
premise that user information should be considered 
as a tradable commodity to be purchased by 
companies. In simple terms, this model suggests 
that companies should pay users (data creators) 
for the access and use of their information.138 This 
system conceptualises personal data in a way similar 
to intellectual property rights. In a behavioural 
advertising context, users have, potentially, limited 
control over their data and knowledge of the 
controller’s identity under the current system. As 
such, the concept of users controlling and selling 
their data as a commodity is appealing. However, 
although there are clear benefits to this model, it 
appears to lack the practicality to truly develop as an 
alternative in this unrefined form. There are several 
key reasons for this negative outlook. First, there is 
strong debate as to whether or not the traditional 
forms of property laws are capable of providing the 
necessary protection for personal information.139 
This is due to the fact that ‘[n]ormatively, no 
proprietary rights exist on personal information. It 
pertains to an individual, but it does not belong to 
him or her in a proprietary sense’.140 
77 It is difficult to equate personal data with intellectual 
property rights as, in contrast to IP, personal data 
only gains value when placed in the hands of 
advertisers. 141 Lessig, in advocating the merits of this 
economic approach and his instrumentalist theory 
of propertisation, has observed that if personal data 
was viewed in economic terms, the industry would 
be forced to develop specific PETs that would be 
capable of adequately protecting the users’ personal 
data.142 However, it remains unclear whether or not 
the commodification of personal data would truly 
inspire this protection. Companies rely on this 
information for advertising which, in turn, allows 
them to offer their website’s services. If advertisers 
were forced to buy the information from the users, 
large portions of the publishers’ revenue would 
be eliminated. 143 This could result in widespread 
charging for website access. In addition, this model 
would result in ubiquitous standard form contracts 
as the large internet service providers would be 
unable to individually negotiate contracts with 
each user. This would seemingly defeat this model’s 
purpose of empowering people by forcing them to 
comply with contracts designed for the masses. 
clearly fall into the explicit opt-in consent category 
due to the absence of a pre-selected default position. 
74 The proposal may dilute the significance of the 
consent requirement by requiring users to repeatedly 
reconfirm their decision. In the context of internet 
browsing, this form of dynamic consent may be more 
of a nuisance than an aid. This approach also fails to 
take into account multi-user devices which may only 
allow the first user to effectively decide for or against 
tracking. Of course, an effective solution to this would 
be to require a browser log-in to enable access. This 
would allow ad networks and other similar service 
providers to distinguish between users and, hence, 
user consent preferences. However, to establish 
a log-in requirement would be cumbersome, 
impractical and a violation of the very idea behind 
the internet. In addition, such restrictions of access 
could potentially be deemed a violation of human 
rights given the increasing recognition of the right 
to broadband globally and, paradoxically, could also 
create privacy concerns in itself, as it would directly 
result in the creation of a profile.135 Alternatively, 
one could require the start-up wizard to appear on 
the opening of each browsing session. This would 
allow the users to make informed decisions, but it 
would not deal with the potential development of a 
tracking profile that may have been created during 
previous browsing sessions. Moreover, this repeated 
requirement to make a decision would dilute the 
effectiveness and genuine legitimacy of user consent 
and would also be, potentially, deemed a restriction 
on the right of access. 
75 It is clear from the above that it is extremely 
difficult to find an adequate balance between user 
and commercial interests. However, the systems 
described rely on existing notions of technology. 
Alternatively, one could consider tackling this issue 
at its root by changing technology’s interaction with 
privacy in the design phase. With this in mind, Ian 
Brown has outlined an approach to protecting user 
data through guarding it on the user’s device rather 
than allowing ad networks to store this information 
on their servers.136 The proposal envisages the use 
of advertising scripts that would then request 
access to the device in order to render targeted 
advertisements. These scripts would not record 
or send any data. In simple terms, the advertiser 
would send a number of advertisements to the 
device and based on the personal data contained 
in certain specified files (i.e. a locally held profile), 
an appropriate advertisement would be rendered. 
This model was first considered by Brown et al. in 
the context of mobile phones, however, it appears 
to have general applicability across all devices.137 
The proposal depends on the adequate processing 
power of the devices and technological capacity. To 
effectively implement the proposals, no negative 
impact on the user experience can be permitted. 
This model is influenced strongly by the notion of 
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Finally, as noted by Cohen, the model appears to be 
contrary to the EU concept of ‘personhood’.144 This 
stipulates that privacy is a fundamental part of the 
person which is ‘non-commodifiable’ and part of the 
European human rights edifice.145 
78 In addition to the criticisms already mentioned, there 
are also some very practical concerns regarding 
the actual relevance of this model given big data 
processing. Essentially, with today’s technology the 
proprietary rights model may not be feasible as users 
would not be able to restrict access to the massive 
amounts of data (including meta-data) they place 
online. Companies are capable of exploiting this data 
leakage and would, therefore, be able to track users’ 
behaviour without having to rely on the data held 
by the users themselves. There is, therefore, a need 
for an open access personal data tracking platform 
that allows users to effectively manage their online 
identity. Without such a mechanism, this will remain 
a very abstract model that fails to realistically cater 
for the recent computing developments. Brown’s 
model does provide an interesting expansion of this 
idea, despite the fact that he does not quite extend 
his definition of property to include personal data. 
To incorporate privacy into the very design of the 
product could legitimately provide a strong basis for 
the future protection of users. This move towards 
device-specific protections could result in the 
development of an adequate response. Nevertheless, 
it should be noted that any move in this direction 
could be strongly opposed by manufacturers, ad 
networks and other advertising industry service 
providers. 
IV.  Code is Law
79 It is clear that the effective balancing of the 
respective interests is difficult. In order to make 
significant progress in relation to the protection 
of users, privacy will need to be incorporated 
into the design of devices. To focus too strongly 
on the implementation of legal requirements is 
inappropriate given the inflexibility of this form 
of regulation. It is important to remember Lessig’s 
classifications and, thus, the balancing of the 
modalities of regulation.146 This refers to the notion 
that ‘Code is law’ and, hence, the effective balancing 
of the law, norms, architecture (code) and market. 
It is the mix of these modalities that is significant 
and any response needs to effectively consider the 
merits of each. Lessig proffers that code, in itself, 
has a regulatory dimension in that it can effectively 
direct the actions of the users. Indeed, he notes that 
code and law both play an important role in the 
information society. Significantly, code is preferable 
as it is not as easily ignored as legal rules. Use is 
restricted by the architecture of the system, whereas 
compliance with laws can be a matter of choice. In 
applying this concept to OBA, ad networks could 
be restricted in their actions through the effective 
implementation of a code which effectively balances 
the modalities of regulation. The incorporation of 
privacy-enhancing defaults into the design of future 
technologies is perhaps the only means of ensuring 
the effective safeguarding of user privacy. 
80 The key point from the above analysis is that the 
interpretation of consent will continue to be a sticky 
issue under the EU Data Protection framework unless 
decisive measures are taken. The development of the 
PETs have shown that, without the consideration 
of privacy from the outset, uncertainties regarding 
protection will remain. Accordingly, the concept of 
privacy by design holds the key to the development of 
future protections capable of adequately protecting 
personal data.
F. Conclusion
81 In a world of ones and zeroes, the traditional legal 
concepts of privacy and data protection struggle 
daily with advanced technological development. The 
current legal framework is ill-equipped to deal with 
modern computing. Privacy protection is of clear 
importance to modern society and a strong privacy 
framework is paramount. However, that is not to 
say that commercial interests should be disregarded. 
The economic benefits of an open internet that 
allows for behavioural advertising are clear and one 
should not simply arrest development. Technologists 
should be given the scope to commercialise their 
ingenuities. Nevertheless, just because an action is 
technologically possible does not mean that it should 
be legal or  that it benefits society. From the analysis, 
it is clear that the use of cookies in the context of 
behavioural advertising invokes the applicability of 
the EU Data Protection Framework. Although there 
appears to be some uncertainty as to whether this 
practice amounts to personal data processing, it is 
clear from the analysis that this is the most probable 
interpretation. Nevertheless, the lex specialis rules 
in the E-Privacy Directive ensure some degree of 
protection for the users. The requirements elicited 
by these Directives are easy to decipher. However, 
the interpretation (and lack of a concrete definition) 
of the concept of consent has proven to be a serious 
impediment to progress. The proposed adoption of an 
explicit opt-in consent requirement is controversial. 
One has to question whether this will result in the 
dilution of the notion of consent and its benefits.  
82 As outlined supra, the notion of ‘sticky defaults’ and 
the associated problems are the consequences of the 
focus on consent. The online advertising industry has 
taken advantage of this uncertainty. Nevertheless, 
it is also questionable whether a simple switch in 
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the EU’s standards from those of other countries. 
However, this should not prevent action where it is 
merited and it is clear that reform is required. The 
fate of the proposed regulation and the potential 
future amendment of the E-Privacy Directive must 
be watched closely. 
86 Therefore, the legal realities surrounding OBA 
remain uncertain. Without clarification, the 
monitoring of the protection of personal data will be 
unclear and ineffective. In conclusion, the European 
Commission has wrongly focused on the issue of 
consent and should require more active protection 
in the design phase of the devices as provided for 
under the proposed Regulation.
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